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Abstract 
In practice firms are faced by a range of market frictions and barriers, which prevent them from 
undertaking investments in efficiency and low-carbon technologies. Thus, even when 
environmental taxes are imposed, firms may be unable (or unwilling) to adjust their behaviour 
and technology in response to price signals. With a focus on energy and material efficiency 
investments, this paper systematically investigates how the theoretical assumptions of perfectly 
competitive and efficient markets are violated in practice, and how this results in complex and 
interlinked investment barriers. It classifies five categories of investment barriers: information, 
capacity, and financial constraints, as well as uncompetitive market structures and fiscal 
mismanagement; and presents evidence on each of these. It concludes by proposing a range of 
measures for mitigating investment barriers, and addressing their structural causes. Overall, the 
evidence presented in this paper aims to help increase the effectiveness of environmental taxes 
and regulation, by identifying market imperfections that environmental taxes alone cannot 
address.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Externality taxes in the presence of market distortions 
Overconsumption of energy and resources, as well as their inefficient use are a key source of 
negative externalities, such as carbon emissions, pollution and the associated impacts on health. 
Pigou (1920) proposed to impose a tax on those activities that cause negative externalities, and 
argued that a tax which corresponds to the external social cost of certain activities will change 
behaviours and maximise social welfare (Aldy et al., 2010). The introduction of carbon taxes, 
fuel taxes, pollution taxes, congestion charges, or waste tariffs all follow the Pigouvian 
principle and will result in higher factor prices and production costs particularly for resource 
and energy intensive firms. Also the removal of subsidies for fossil fuels or inefficient 
industries are Pigouvian in the sense that they internalise social and environmental costs to 
some (albeit not full) extent.  
In an ideal setting, environmental taxation is the most efficient way of incentivising firms to 
increase factor productivity, i.e. improving energy efficiency, lowering resource use, and 
reducing carbon emissions, by modernising production processes and infrastructure, and 
investing in other efficiency enhancing measures (Requate, 1998). In short, firms are expected 
to implement exactly those measures, which reduce social costs and environmental impacts. In 
addition, there is evidence for a double dividend from externality taxes, as tax revenues can be 
used to reduce other distortionary taxes (e.g. on labour) and mitigate associated economic 
inefficiencies (Bovenberg, 1999; Goulder, 2013). In theory, this makes externality taxes 
preferable to command & control instruments (such as efficiency standards) – and yet the 
political challenges of raising externality taxes have meant that energy or fuel efficiency 
standards (or even inaction) remain attractive alternatives (Parry et al., 2014). 
Indeed, in practice Pigouvian taxes can be unpopular and ineffective without complementary 
policies. For instance, in an urban setting, Avner et al. (2014) show that the effectiveness of 
carbon and fuel taxes is significantly lower, when they are not complemented by investments 
in public transport infrastructure. In practice it is also challenging to estimate the adequate level 
of a Pigouvian tax (e.g. Pindyck, 2013, on the social cost of carbon), and knowledge spill-
overs, imperfect foresight and lacking credibility of a long-term carbon price can undermine 
effectiveness (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Hallegatte et al., 2013; Vogt-Schilb & Hallegatte, 2014). 
Moreover, the negative impact on existing polluting capital and stranded assets come at 
political costs, which hamper implementation (Rozenberg et al., 2014).  
This paper argues that at the firm level the effectiveness of environmental taxes, and green 
fiscal reforms (e.g. fuel subsidies removal), depends crucially on whether and how firms are 
able to respond to changing price incentives (e.g. by increasing energy and resource efficiency). 
In fact, for modernising production processes and realising efficiency gains, firms rely on a 
wide range of factors such as access to technology and information, technical capacity, and 
financial infrastructure. The absence of any of these factors, as well as constrained competition, 
trade protectionism, and fiscal mismanagement are likely to create barriers for firms to respond 
to environmental taxes by increasing energy and resource efficiency. These barriers can prevent 
the “first-best outcomes” of environmental taxes to be achieved, and have been often 
overlooked in the literature on environmental policy and clean investments (Requate, 2003; 
2004; Domenech et al., 2014; Dijk & Kemp, 2016).  
This paper shows that these barriers form a complex web, which obstructs corporate 
investments in efficiency, and hence diminishes the effectiveness of “green price instruments”. 
The complexity and interconnectedness of these barriers is difficult to capture in theoretical 
analyses on the effectiveness of externality taxes. Some General Equilibrium models account 
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for pre-existing distortionary taxes, or for imperfect information when analysing the impacts 
of carbon taxes (Parry et al., 1999; Bovenberg & Goulder, 1996) – however, they typically 
yield an incomplete account of challenges in the wider political economy and investment 
environment. In fact, theoretical studies of policy optimality tend to be based on the assumption 
of perfect competition, while far fewer studies consider the real need for second-best policy 
solutions (Montero, 2002; Lipsey & Lancaster, 1956).  
This paper systematically reviews the barriers which may prevent firms from responding to the 
incentives set through environmental pricing instruments (including pollution taxes, or 
environmental regulation). As a benchmark, this paper refers to the fundamental theorems of 
welfare economics and the hypothetical characteristics of perfectly competitive markets 
(Section 1.2). It analyses how the hypothetical conditions which underlie perfectly competitive 
markets are violated in practice due to market failures and distortions, thus preventing firms 
from improving efficiency (Section 2). It argues that these distortions create investment 
barriers, which are exacerbated by systemic risks and uncertainty. It concludes that 
environmental taxes and subsidy reforms are likely to be ineffective without complementary 
policies which mitigate market distortions (Section 3).  
 
1.2. Competitive markets, distortions and the rationale for complementary policies 
Barriers and market distortions can diminish the effectiveness of Pigouvian taxes, as they 
prevent firms from improving material or energy efficiency in response to price signals 
(Flachenecker & Rentschler, 2015). In order to understand and categorise these barriers this 
paper refers to the two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics: The First Fundamental 
Welfare Theorem suggests perfectly competitive markets as a hypothetical benchmark for 
investigating the efficiency of actual market outcomes. Such perfectly competitive markets are 
based on several assumptions, including (Blaug, 2007): 
 Perfect information 
 No oligo- or monopolies 
 No barriers to market entry (or exit) 
 Perfect factor mobility 
 Zero transaction costs 
 Absence of externalities. 
The violation of any of these assumptions leads to market failures, which hamper the 
effectiveness of externality taxes. 
Also in the context of firms’ energy and resource efficiency, violations of these assumptions 
are ubiquitous in practice: Information or capacity constraints can lead to inefficient decision 
making in the face of environmental taxes. Missing or inefficient markets (e.g. for credit) can 
constrain the implementation of efficiency enhancing measures. Other missing markets (e.g. 
for carbon) can lead to severe externalities and excess waste. Large firms and protected 
industries face little competitive pressures to invest in efficiency gains, especially if 
protectionist trade policies are in place. This may also mean that environmental taxes are 
simply passed on to consumers, while firms take no further efficiency enhancing measures. 
Physical production infrastructure tends to be difficult and expensive to adjust to frequently 
changing market conditions, leading to long-term technology lock-in. Overall, all such factors 
will limit the ability of firms to respond to price based environmental policies (e.g. taxes and 
subsidy reforms) by improving energy or resource efficiency. 
4 
 
If no additional measures are undertaken to alleviate these barriers, firms may have few means 
to reduce the environmental tax burden. This will possibly reduce firms’ competitiveness – 
while the actual policy objective of reducing environmental externalities remains 
unaccomplished. Moreover, without complementary measures to reduce investment barriers, 
the accumulation of new productive capital is likely to be characterised by inefficiency. This 
infrastructure then pre-determines and possibly restricts investment and innovation options 
available in the future. Such so called ‘path dependence’ can even result in a lock-in situation, 
in which costs associated with pre-existing inefficiency prevent any future investments into 
efficiency and green innovation (Hallegatte et al., 2013).  
In practice, the assumptions underlying perfectly competitive markets are violated in many 
ways; not rarely due to inadequate policy making and regulation. However on the flipside, the 
Second Welfare Theorem assigns an important role to market interventions (e.g. by 
governments), stating that they may improve Pareto efficiency of a given economic allocation 
by redistributing resources. In practice however, the government’s role can also be negative if 
public policy provides perverse incentives (e.g. by subsidising inefficient behaviour), thus 
perpetuating inefficiencies. Within this framing, the subsequent sections will discuss specific 
barriers which may prevent firms from implementing energy and resource efficiency, and green 
innovation measures. It will thus suggest entry points for measures to complement standard 
price based environmental policies. 
 
2. Barriers to resource efficiency investments 
Ideally, environmental taxes and removal of distortive subsidies (e.g. fossil fuel subsidies) will 
increase the cost of polluting production practices, and thus cause firms to invest into cleaner, 
more efficient, low-carbon technology. However in practice, barriers may mean that 
investments do not deliver the anticipated efficiency gains, or that they are not undertaken at 
all. Based on Flachenecker & Rentschler (2015), this chapter outlines the key barriers as 
summarised in Table 1, and presents a framework for systematically assessing the environment 
within which efficiency investments take place. Each of the columns corresponds to a violation 
of one (or more) of the basic hypothetical conditions for perfectly competitive and efficient 
markets. This extends the discussion on market failures by Gillingham et al. (2009) by 
providing empirical evidence at the firm level. 
Barriers to Investments in Energy & Resource Efficiency 
Investment 
barriers at 
the firm or 
government 
level 
Information 
constraints 
 Limited 
information 
on scale and 
type of 
inefficiencies 
(monitoring & 
disclosure) 
 Limited 
information on 
modern 
technology and 
methods 
(access   & 
dissemination) 
 
Capacity 
constraints 
 Technical 
capacity 
 Managerial 
capacity 
 Institutional 
capacity 
 Lacking 
awareness & 
individual 
biases 
 
Financial 
constraints 
 Uncertain 
payoffs 
hamper 
financing (e.g. 
due to lacking 
information) 
 Competing 
investment 
opportunities 
 Inadequate 
credit markets  
Market 
structures 
 Lack of 
competition 
(e.g. mono-/ 
oligopolies) 
 Protected 
industries 
 Trade 
protectionism 
 
Fiscal mis-
management 
 Subsidies to 
inefficient, 
polluting 
industries 
 Subsidies for 
polluting 
inputs (e.g. 
fossil fuels) 
 Lacking 
enforcement 
(e.g. carbon 
taxes & 
landfill tariffs) 
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Systemic 
risks & 
uncertainty 
 
 Resource price volatility 
 Economic, political and social stability              Can exacerbate existing barriers. 
 Lacking long term credibility of policies 
Table 1. Barriers to efficiency investments: Underinvestment in energy & resource efficiency can be due to 
various market or government failures (Flachenecker & Rentschler, 2015).1 
2.1.Information constraints  
Monitoring & disclosure: limited information on the scale and nature of inefficiencies 
‘Imperfect’ information violates one of the key assumptions underlying efficient markets. 
Which are the most inefficient processes in a specific firm (or industry)? How inefficient are 
they? Without this knowledge firms may be unable to undertake targeted investments in 
response to environmental taxes, and governments may be unable to design adequately targeted 
policies to complement environmental taxes. Specifically, there are two major issues: (i) 
Insufficient firm level monitoring of energy and resource efficiency and environmental 
performance (possibly due to insufficient legal disclosure requirements): This may prevent 
firms from identifying whether and where within their operations green investments can reduce 
environmental tax burdens; and (ii) insufficient information disclosure of environmental 
performance and lacking industry level monitoring of efficiency: This may prevent 
governments from designing targeted policies to complement environmental taxes.  
The lack of comprehensive, regular monitoring and disclosure at the firm and household level 
makes it difficult to track potential improvements, and identify particularly successful 
investments. The Principles of Corporate Governance by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2004) argue that an effective legal framework is critical 
for ensuring an industry wide practice of information disclosure. When enforced effectively, 
this will entail better performance monitoring at the firm level, thus facilitating efficiency 
enhancing investments and modernisation measures (OECD, 2004; World Bank, 2006). 
Furthermore, Onischka et al. (2012) argue that reporting requirements on corporate resource 
and energy efficiency performance and investments are critical for increasing the acceptance 
by firms (and banks) of resource efficiency projects. They also suggest that in the longer term 
such disclosure practices can play an important role in making commercial financing of energy 
and resource efficiency more accessible and affordable.  
The introduction of environmental taxes and regulation may put the access to and affordability 
of vital inputs at risk. In order to mitigate the risks from input scarcity, firms will need to 
improve the efficiency with which such inputs are used. However, the monitoring and 
disclosure of such resource input related risks remain limited. A series of assessments has 
shown that e.g. in the Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Middle East, and North Africa, disclosure 
of corporate information (e.g. on technological or environmental risks to operations) remains 
insufficient in terms of coverage and quality (World Bank, 2006; 2004; 2004). In a model of 
technology adoption and policy timing, D’Amato & Dijkstra (2015) show that resulting 
information asymmetries can result in corporate under-investment in efficient technology. 
If implemented comprehensively, the benefits of performance monitoring and disclosure can 
mitigate information constraints at the macro level: As policy makers gain a better 
understanding of inefficiencies in the energy and resource use of the private sector, they are 
able to design targeted measures and regulation for complementing Pigouvian taxes. In the 
                                                     
1 This categorisation of barriers is adapted from Chapter 2 of the World Bank’s World Development Report 
2014 (Typology of obstacles to risk management) by Stéphane Hallegatte. 
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European Union (EU) for instance, firm level surveys have managed to identify the key 
barriers, which prevent firms from improving their resource and energy efficiency (European 
Commission, 2013). The “Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe” (European Commission, 
2011) and the EU Energy Efficiency Directive (European Commission, 2012), which outline 
goals and policy measures for increasing efficiency at a large scale, critically rely on such 
information. This confirms studies by Baron (1985) and Laffont (1994) who highlight the 
important role of information for designing effective environmental policy.  
 
Dissemination, access and management: limited information on the solutions 
Firms are necessarily unable to implement low-carbon, less polluting technology, when 
markets (or governments) fail to provide adequate information on the costs, benefits, and 
methods of increasing the efficiency of resource and energy use in their production processes. 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2013) notes that the lack of information considerably 
increases the transaction costs (in terms of time and effort) of implementing energy and 
resource efficiency measures, as well as of modernisation and green innovation more generally. 
Evidence for SMEs in China shows that information constraints are one of the key barriers to 
energy efficiency investments (Kostka et al., 2013). 
Corporate management of information. Various studies show that the management of 
information is a key determinant of innovation and technological change in firms. 
Technological change however is crucial in order to modernise old, polluting, inefficient 
production machinery, and thus respond to environmental regulation and taxes (Bastein et al., 
2014). Frishammar & Hörte (2005) find that the way in which firms manage information 
determines innovation and efficiency gains to a significant extent. Anderson & Newell (2004) 
and Sutherland (1991) too highlight the critical role of information in promoting energy 
efficiency gains. Disseminating the knowledge about the existence and functionality of new 
technology requires effective information infrastructure (Howarth & Andersson, 1993).  
Access to information. Firms will fail to improve energy efficiency in response Pigouvian 
energy taxes, if they lack access to relevant information and technologies. For instance, almost 
50% of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the EU perceive information constraints 
as a key obstacle to improving resource efficiency (European Commission, 2013). Struggling 
to access adequate information, they state that the most useful support mechanism for 
improving resource efficiency would be either (i) firm specific technical assistance (i.e. 
consultancy), or (ii) detailed information on technologies and processes for resource efficiency. 
Firms in lower income economies struggle with access to information to an even larger extent 
(Figure 1). Rohdin et al. (2007) confirm similar issues, and show that information access 
constraints are a key obstacle to improving energy efficiency in the Swedish foundry industry. 
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Figure 1 Whether latest technologies (and related information) are available and accessible to firms, 
determines to a significant extent whether firms adopt such technologies into their operations. This 
figure shows availability and absorption scores (standardised, where 7 represents the maximum). In 
global comparison, the USA rank 6th and Kyrgyzstan 138th. (World Economic Forum , 2013) 
 The need for efficiency audits and information programs. Furthermore, Rohdin et al. (2007) 
find that technical consultants and auditors can play a critical role in overcoming information 
constraints. In the USA for instance, government financed information services aimed to 
increase awareness for resource efficiency and offer technical assistance. These programmes 
included educational workshops, training programmes, advertising, or on-site efficiency audits. 
Andersen & Newell (2004) show that these information programmes were very successful in 
alerting firms of cost-effective efficiency investments, and providing technical information, 
thus reducing the uncertainty related to adopting new technology. They show that as a 
consequence of such information programmes, manufacturing firms adopted at least half of the 
recommended energy efficiency projects. Also in the EU 17% of (11,000 surveyed) firms state 
that the difficulty of identifying cost-effective resource efficiency projects is a key obstacle to 
improving resource efficiency; another 20% state a “lack of specific expertise” as the main 
obstacle (European Commission, 2013). This figure is likely to be higher in countries, where 
technical information and advisory services are less widely available.  
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Figure 2 Percentage of firms identifying which measures are most effective in helping them adopt 
energy and resource efficient technologies. Technical assistance, and different types of information 
programmes prove to be critical (European Commission, 2013). 
DeCanio (1993) emphasises the crucial importance of providing informational services as a 
complement to standard regulatory instruments and technology investments. Resource and 
energy efficiency targets, standards, and environmental taxation and regulation more generally 
cannot trigger the desired effects, if information on alternative, more efficient and cleaner 
technology is not available. Firms, without the knowledge of effective ways to increase 
efficiency, will continue to operate within existing information constraints – thus unable to 
realise the efficiency gains envisaged by regulators.  
2.2. Capacity constraints 
Efficiency investments: Do the characteristics of firms matter? 
Capacity constraints at the individual, firm, or government level may mean that even if 
information exists (e.g. about the cost-efficiency of resource efficiency solutions), decision 
makers may not be able or willing to act upon it.2 All investments with a positive net present 
value (NPV) will be implemented by profit maximising firms – at least so claims standard 
neoclassical theory. In practice however countless examples show that not all such profitable 
projects are implemented by firms (incl. simple measures such as energy efficient light bulbs, 
DeCanio & Watkins, 1998). Bastein et al. (2014) show for a sample of firms from the EU-27 
that this lack of investment in efficiency can be explained by various barriers internal to firms. 
Also the European Commission (2013) identifies firms’ technical capacity as a key constraint 
to the implementation of cost-effective investments in resource and energy efficiency. 
In a discrete choice model, DeCanio & Watkins (1998) show that the characteristics of firms 
play a key role in determining whether they implement profitable efficiency projects or not. 
They identify characteristics such as the number of employees, company earnings, or the 
industrial sector to influence decision making. This shows that the simple availability of a 
positive NPV project will not ensure its implementation, if the firm is unable or unwilling to 
do so. Likewise, price signals (due to Pigouvian taxes) may not be enough trigger efficiency 
investments. In another study DeCanio et al. (1993) show that organisational structure is a key 
determinant for the effective adoption of innovations, and thus of efficiency gains. They 
                                                     
2 This violates the hypothetical condition of perfectly competitive markets that economic agents can make rational decisions 
based on available information, without incurring transaction costs (such as having to hire external technical consultants). 
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emphasise that certain organisations are better adapted than others in terms of technical and 
managerial capacity, thus enabling them to implement efficiency investments more effectively.  
At the firm level: Technical expertise and management capacity  
Technical capacity. Technical capacity is essential, in order to effectively assess, install, 
operate and maintain modern, efficient and clean technology (Durbin, 2004). Complementing 
environmental taxes with financial support mechanisms for firms to acquire such technology, 
may not be sufficient if firms lack the technical expertise to install or operate it. This implies 
that investments in physical infrastructure (e.g. production machinery), which aim at improving 
resource and energy efficiency, should be accompanied by measures to build technical 
expertise within firms. 
Especially in manufacturing firms improving energy and resource efficiency typically requires 
technological change. For instance, more modern and efficient machinery, advanced 
monitoring techniques, and adequate installation and maintenance of machinery are critical to 
achieving a higher degree of resource productivity. Basic technical knowledge can help 
managers appreciate the importance of efficiency related investments, and the opportunities 
associated with them.  
 
Figure 3 Percentage of manufacturing firms, which state technical capacity to be a major obstacle to 
their operations (EBRD, 2009).  
Regional evidence. In the EU, 20% of SMEs state the ‘lack of specific expertise’ to be the 
biggest obstacle to resource efficiency investments (European Commission, 2013). Another 
17% state that ‘difficulties in identifying suitable actions’ (i.e. investment opportunities) as the 
main reason for not being able to invest in resource efficiency. While such specific data is 
scarce for developing and emerging countries, there is evidence suggesting that technical 
capacity is a major constraint for firms, even more than for their EU counterparts. In Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia the majority of manufacturing firms consider technical capacity and 
an inadequately educated workforce to be a major impediment to their firms’ operations (Figure 
3) (EBRD, 2010). 
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Management capacity. Resource efficiency investments are typically subject to the process of 
developing or identifying technological innovations, and then implementing them within 
operating production and consumption systems. Such a process requires forward-looking 
management, which is able to identify opportunities for efficiency gains (DeCanio & Watkins, 
1998). Indeed the ADB (2013) notes that firms typically perceive ‘greening’ of their businesses 
to cause potentially severe disruptions to on-going operations. A regional firm survey 
conducted in Eastern Europe and Central Asia by the European Bank for Reconstruction & 
Development (EBRD, 2010) uses Bloom & van Reenen’s (2007) methodology for 
investigating management practices in manufacturing firms. The survey shows that firms 
perform poorly compared to their counterparts in developed economies (Figure 4). While the 
survey does not focus on resource efficiency directly, such lack of managerial capacity is likely 
to hamper the effective implementation of efficiency investments, which environmental taxes 
would necessitate.  
 
Figure 4   Indicators of managerial capacity (EBRD, 2010) 
Institutional capacity 
The external environment for implementing resource and energy efficiency investments and 
green innovation is determined by the quality of government and administrative capacity. 
Inadequate government capacity can create major obstacles to firms: corruption, politicised 
planning, ineffective enforcement, cumbersome bureaucratic processes, and the lack of 
competitive market regulation can make it difficult for firms to undertake green investments in 
practice (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2010; Botems & Bourgeon, 2005). Certainly these issues are 
relevant beyond environmental considerations and affect corporate investments and operations 
more generally. Nevertheless, they can create significant obstacles to the effective functioning 
of environmental taxes and regulation, and thus require policy makers’ attention (Bastein et al., 
2014). 
The fact that the administrative environment can obstruct green investments, can even be 
observed in the EU, where administrative capacity is considered comparably high: 26% of 
SMEs indicated complex legal or administrative procedures to be a key obstacle to 
implementing energy and resource efficiency measures (European Commission, 2013). In 
environments, where government effectiveness, regulatory quality, transparency, and the rule 
of law are weaker, this percentage can be thought to be considerably higher.  
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Emerging and developing countries and resource rich countries in particular tend to perform 
poorly with respect to various governance indicators (e.g. corruption, or regulatory quality) 
(World Bank, 2014). Data by the EBRD (2010) shows that between 20% and 50% of firms in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia perceive lacking administrative capacity to be the single most 
severe obstacle to their operations.  
 
Biases at the Individual Level 
Awareness. Lacking awareness and understanding of the benefits of energy and resource 
efficiency and green innovation can lead decision makers to underestimate opportunities. 
Lacking awareness can typically be attributed to information deficits, though Morris & 
Venkatesh (2000) show that age can also influence decisions to adopt technology. These cases 
provide a direct rationale for implementing targeted information programs to build awareness. 
Studying a sample of SMEs in Germany, Jordan et al. (2014) identify lacking awareness to be 
one of the key barriers to investments in resource efficiency.  
Behavioural biases. It must also be acknowledged that behavioural biases at the individual 
level strongly influence decision making, and can prevent the implementation of efficiency 
measures which would make economic sense. Such factors can partly root in the cultural and 
socio-economic context. Partly, they can be due to information constraints. Most 
fundamentally, the failure to act upon information may also reflect behavioural biases, which 
are simply linked to human nature. DeCanio (1993) for instance notes that ‘bounded 
rationality’ can create substantial hurdles within firms to the implementation of energy 
efficiency measures. Kammerlander (2014) also shows that behavioural biases of individual 
users can pose significant barriers to the implementation of resource efficiency measures.  
2.3. Financial market constraints 
Especially energy-intensive manufacturing firms may need to implement substantial 
investments in modernising technology, once an environmental tax (e.g. carbon tax) is 
imposed. For SMEs in low and medium income economies, cash flows may not permit major 
investments in efficiency and modernisation, without relying on external credit sources. 
Allwood et al. (2011) note that businesses, which previously invested heavily in production 
systems, may face lock-ins due to constrained liquidity, preventing them from investing in 
modernisation and efficiency gains. In such a situation imposing an environmental tax may 
have little effect, if firms cannot afford to update or adjust their technology. Also in the EU, 
34% of firms perceive high up-front investments costs to be the most significant obstacle to 
improving environmental performance (European Commission, 2013). Notably, this is despite 
various financial support mechanisms available from the EU and its member governments (e.g. 
the material efficiency programme in Germany; KfW, 2013). In emerging and developing 
countries such support for green innovation and modernisation is typically more scarce, and 
financial constraints more substantial.  
Uncertain investment payoffs hamper financing 
Once firms face an increased financial burden due to environmental taxes, they may be cautious 
of taking on the financial risk of investing in expensive new (and unknown) technology, and 
banks cautious of financing it. When resource and energy efficiency investments are not widely 
recognised as a way of cutting operating costs and increasing competitiveness, the commercial 
viability of such investments may not be perceived positively. Various studies show that 
lacking information and proliferation may lead firms (and local banks) to perceive the benefits 
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of energy and resource efficiency investments as uncertain (European Commission, 2013; 
Anderson & Newell, 2004; Rohdin, Tholander, & Solding, 2007). Moreover, banks are likely 
to perceive investments in efficiency and “greening” as risky, especially if there is no larger 
scale reporting on the performance of similar projects (Onischka, Liedtke, & Jordan, 2012). 
Similarly, unknown technology is associated with risks, as information on reliability and 
durability may not exist (Anderson & Newell, 2004). 
The viability and profitability of resource related investments also critically depend on 
commodity prices. For instance, highly volatile resource prices make it difficult for firms to 
plan investments related to energy or resource efficiency, and reduce the availability and 
affordability of credit (for details see Section 3.6). 
Alternative investments and opportunity costs  
Firms face a broad range of possible investment opportunities, out of which energy or resource 
efficiency investments are not necessarily the most profitable ones – even if an environmental 
tax on resource or energy use is imposed. Bleischwitz (2012) for instance notes that labour 
costs typically constitute a major element of production costs, and shows that firms in the EU 
have invested heavily in labour productivity. Indeed, when green technology or efficiency 
investments compete with other investment opportunities for limited funds, the presence of 
barriers (e.g. capacity or information constraints) may mean that environmental taxes remain 
relatively ineffective in achieving their environmental objective. More conventional 
investments (e.g. in labour productivity) may be associated with lower risks and higher returns, 
thus crowding out funds from investments in clean, low-carbon, efficient (but unknown) 
technology (Bleischwitz & Hennicke, 2004; Bleischwitz 2010). Evidence for the European 
foundry industry shows that the presence of alternative investment and business priorities is a 
key barrier – especially in an environment of limited financial resources (Trianni et al., 2013). 
 
Structural issues in the banking sector 
Credit markets, particularly in developing and emerging countries, have undergone significant 
turbulences in the past decade. In Eurasia for instance, turbulences have resulted in a general 
loss of credibility of local banks, making credit less available and more expensive (Figure 5) 
(World Bank, 2014). As green investments in hard infrastructure are typically associated with 
payback periods of several years, turbulences in financial markets make such forward looking 
investments difficult.  
 
Figure 5 Throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia, financial services are not only less commonly 
available, but also more expensive than in high-income countries. Countries scores are standardised to 
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a scale from 0 to 7, where 7 is the best. In global comparison, the USA rank 10th/7th 
(affordability/availability), while Kyrgyzstan ranks 130th/131st. 
 
As a consequence of structural problems in the banking sector, firms experience difficulties in 
gaining access to credit for financing efficiency investments and green innovation. Evidence 
from the EU underscores the importance of financial support mechanisms and availability of 
credit for funding green investments: In the EU, 20% of firms undertake energy and resource 
efficiency investments, because financial public support is available (European Commission, 
2013). 24% of all firms perceive the up-front costs of investments to be the main obstacle to 
energy and resource efficiency investments. 
Even in high-income economies like Sweden, with well-developed credit markets, research has 
shown that access to capital is the biggest obstacle to efficiency improvements in industrial 
sectors (Rohdin, Tholander, & Solding, 2007). Similarly, Jordan et al. (2014) show that in 
Germany restricted access to financing is a key barrier to investments in resource efficiency. 
Moreover, the extent to which banks recognise the profitability of energy and resource 
efficiency projects will also depend on monitoring and reporting practices by firms (Onischka, 
Liedtke, & Jordan, 2012). 
Some insight can also be gained from the literature on innovation more generally: Hyytinen & 
Toivanen (2005) for instance provide empirical evidence that financial constraints can play a 
significant role in holding back innovation in industries and firms, which are dependent on 
external financing. They thus argue that in order to promote innovation (and efficiency gains 
likewise), public interventions ought to complement incomplete or inefficient credit markets. 
 
2.4. Uncompetitive market structures 
In well-functioning markets, competitive pressures are the key driver of innovation and 
efficiency gains. Firms can gain a competitive advantage by cutting costs and offering the same 
product at a lower price than competitors. However, if market structures do not allow free 
competition, some of the key assumptions of perfectly efficient markets are violated. Thus, if 
competition is suppressed or certain incumbent firms protected, competitive pressures may not 
suffice to incentivise investments in energy and resource efficiency, modernisation, or low-
carbon innovation (for a comprehensive review see Requate, 2006). The introduction of 
environmental taxes in such a setting is likely to be ineffective without complementary policies 
to foster competition. 
Lack of competition. Monopolies and oligopolies may face lesser incentives to cut costs and 
increase the efficiency of their resource or energy use. The importance of competitive pressures 
in motivating and driving energy and resource efficiency can be seen in the EU (European 
Commission, 2013): Out of 11,000 surveyed firms 63% state that their main motivation for 
improving energy and resource efficiency are “cost savings” in order to improve 
competitiveness. Further 18% of firms directly state “creating a competitive advantage” as their 
main reason to invest in resource efficiency. Another 9% state that improving resource 
efficiency is necessary for “catching up with main competitors” who have already invested in 
resource efficiency – this also implies that competition plays an important role in disseminating 
resource efficiency from a first mover to the entire sector. 
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Figure 6 Competitiveness is a key concern for firms investing in resource and energy efficiency  
(European Commission, 2013). 
Emerging and developing countries have a mixed record of actively promoting market 
competition, indicating shortcomings in regulation and enforcement (World Bank, 2013). 
Barriers to market entry and exit (e.g. protectionist regulation) often prevent more efficient 
firms from entering a market, and outperforming less productive incumbents. Firms which are 
more efficient at complying with environmental standards can operate more cost-effectively in 
the presence of environmental taxes, but may still be unable to compete with protected 
incumbents. Markets dominated by oligopolists or large state run (or formerly state run) 
monopolists may provide fewer incentives for investments towards efficiency gains, as there 
are fewer or no competitive pressures. Aghion et al. (2002) develop a model on competition 
and innovation, and find a strong relationship between the two. By showing that competition 
may increase the incremental profits from innovating, they implicitly emphasise the importance 
of competitive markets to foster resource related innovations and efficiency gains. Schleifer 
(1998) also argues that private ownership of firms is more conducive to innovation and 
efficiency gains than public ownership, which also reduces competitive pressures. 
In an uncompetitive market the introduction of environmental taxes may simply mean that 
firms pass on taxes to consumers in the form of price increases, without improving technology 
(Castagneto-Gissey, 2014). Consumers may then choose to reduce their demand in response, 
thus indirectly reducing absolute environmental impacts. However, it would be preferable in 
terms of aggregate welfare if firms reduced their environmental impacts per unit of output 
instead, e.g. by investing in efficient and clean production technology. 
Trade protectionism. Furthermore, pre-existing market structures and certain industries may 
be protected from foreign competition through protective trade policies. This can reduce 
competition from more efficient foreign firms, which reduces competitive pressures and 
incentives to innovate and increase resource efficiency. It may also obstruct access to foreign 
technologies and services, which may be crucial for improving resource efficiency – especially 
when technologies and expertise are not available domestically. Trade restrictions may make 
it even easier for firms to simply pass on price increases without adjusting technology, as they 
are shielded from more efficient competitors from abroad. 
While direct empirical evidence on the role of trade restrictions in the context of resource 
efficiency is scarce, the literature on innovation and productivity offers some insights. The 
relationship between trade liberalisation measures and industrial productivity gains, has been 
explored in an early theoretical study by Rodrik (1988), and subsequently confirmed by various 
empirical studies. These studies argue that by being able to import modern technology from 
abroad, firms are able to realise efficiency gains: For instance, firm-level evidence from Turkey 
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suggests that following a number of trade liberalisation measures in the 1980’s, innovation 
among Turkish manufacturing firms increased significantly (Pamukcu, 2003). Most notably, 
improvements in innovation took the form of imported machinery, enabling increases in firm 
productivity. Similar results are presented by Krishna & Mitra (1998), who show that trade 
liberalisation measures in India increased competition and the growth rate of productivity 
across various industrial sectors. 
2.5. Fiscal mismanagement 
Most adverse social and environmental impacts from resource use and energy production fail 
to be reflected in market prices of these commodities (Allwood et al., 2011, on natural resources 
specifically). In order to account for such externalities, corrective taxation and subsidy policy 
can direct firms and households towards desired economic outcomes by providing financial 
incentives, which the market per se may fail to provide. Fiscal mismanagement however can 
aggravate the problems. 
Subsidies  
One common example of a distortive fiscal policy is the provision of resource subsidies, which 
ease the usage or increase the commercial attractiveness of a specific resource, for instance by 
artificially suppressing the local price of a resource (Yeo et al., 2010). As a consequence, end 
users face lower usage costs, and tend towards overconsumption and inefficient usage of the 
resource. In addition to environmental and efficiency issues, resource subsidies cause an 
increasing burden to national accounts: As international resource prices increase (in levels and 
volatility), providing price subsidies becomes increasingly expensive and unpredictable.  
Both energy and producer subsidies directly undermine the effectiveness of environmental 
taxes, and can be considered to be the policy antithesis to Pigouvian taxes. In fact, many 
countries (including G20 economies) have parallel fiscal systems in place, which both subsidise 
the use or extraction of polluting fuels (especially fossils) and simultaneously impose 
environmental taxes upon them (Whitley, 2013; OECD, 2015). The ADB (2013) identifies 
subsidies as a key barrier to energy efficiency investments in the Asia Pacific region. There is 
evidence from Yemen, Egypt and India that energy subsidies play a central role in exacerbating 
inefficient usage of other scarce resources, especially water (Commander et al., 2015). 
At the same time, it must also be noted that prudent subsidy schemes, targeted at improving 
competitiveness (rather than preserving inefficiencies), can play a substantial positive role e.g. 
by modernising inefficient industries, or supporting low-carbon technology (Fischer et al, 
2015). Following the same rationale the Chinese government for instance announced $6 bn in 
investments in the steel sector in 2000, in order to introduce modern technologies, and improve 
efficiency (US Dept. of Commerce, 2001).  Similarly, the fuel subsidy reform in Iran (in Dec. 
2010) was accompanied by targeted financial assistance to firms to help them restructure and 
modernise in response to increase energy costs (Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2014; IMF, 2013). 
Energy subsidies and resource efficiency. As Allwood et al. (2011) note lower energy prices 
(e.g. due to subsidies) may increase the overall demand for energy intensive materials3. In fact, 
fossil fuel subsidies can directly impact on the resource efficiency of firms, since energy and 
resource efficiency are closely linked. Essentially, this means that if energy is cheap due to 
fossil fuel subsidies, the processing of materials is cheap, and thus energy prices play a lesser 
                                                     
3 For other less energy intensive materials other factors, such as labour costs, can play an important role too. 
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role in motivating resource efficiency. Particularly in energy intensive industries, fossil fuel 
subsidies can thus reduce the incentives to improve resource efficiency.  
A concrete example can illustrate this issue: For each ton of output, the Russian foundry 
industry is estimated to use 3 times more energy, 3.6 times more sand, and 161 times more 
water than comparable EU plants (IFC, 2010). Thus, if Russian plants were to match the level 
of resource efficiency in European plants, they would be able to save close to 20,000GWh of 
energy, 5.7m tons of sand, and 879m cubic meter of water – corresponding to $3.3bn of savings 
per annum (IFC, 2010). However, Russia subsidises energy more than any other high-income 
high-emitting country (E114) at $31.3bn in 2010 (Whitley, 2013). These subsidies play a 
significant role in lowering energy costs, which are 54% lower than for instance in Germany 
(IFC, 2010). Thus, Russian foundry plants would face considerably higher incentives to invest 
in resource efficiency, if energy prices were not subsidised. 
Industry subsidies. Governments may also choose to subsidise specific resource and energy 
intensive industries. Such industry subsidies (i.e. paid to producers) are far less documented, 
partly because of the many non-transparent forms they can take. Nevertheless, Legeida (2002) 
argues that by granting subsidies to inefficient industries, and thus artificially increasing their 
competitiveness, governments prolong existing resource inefficiencies. The steel industry, for 
instance in Russia, Ukraine and Poland, has been documented to receive substantial preferential 
treatment by the state, for instance through low interest loans, tax privileges, or write-offs of 
tax arrears (Legeida, 2002). Such advantages may not come as a surprise as the steel sectors in 
these countries faced substantial structural problems such as over-capacity, over-employment, 
and inefficient, obsolete machinery.  
2.6.Uncertainty, volatility and instability  
Commodity price volatility. While uncertainty per se does not necessarily cause market failures 
and inefficiencies, it may exacerbate existing ones. Even if environmental taxes increase 
average commodity or energy prices, firms may refrain from large capital investments (e.g. in 
energy efficient technology) if prices are volatile. Volatile resource prices can make the payoffs 
from efficiency investments uncertain, thus affecting the expected profitability of investments 
and the ability to finance them. If energy and resource prices are high, investments in the 
conservation and efficient usage of energy and resources prove more attractive, as payback 
periods on investments are shorter. Low prices prolong payback periods, making investments 
less attractive. Furthermore, decreasing commodity prices can pose risks for firms, if efficiency 
investments have already been made: annual payoffs from the investment will be reduced, 
while high interest rates remain. Overall, uncertain prices will make obtaining credit for such 
investments even more difficult and expensive than is already the case.  
This issue has been explored by Pindyck (1990), who showed that irreversible investments 
(e.g. in physical infrastructure with large sunk costs) are particularly sensitive to cash flow 
risks and uncertainty. Pindyck (2006) relates this issue explicitly to environmental policies and 
emphasises the ubiquity of uncertainty surrounding environment related investments 
(including those in energy efficiency). Zhao (2003) too shows that the incentives for firms to 
make irreversible investments in efficient technologies is reduced when cost uncertainties 
increase. 
At the same time it must be noted that increasing resource and energy efficiency is an important 
way to reduce the dependency on resources and the exposure to volatile prices, i.e. to hedge 
against price uncertainty (e.g. Ebrahim et al. (2014) in the context of oil). This implies that the 
                                                     
4 The E11 country grouping is defined as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Poland, Russia, Spain, 
United Kingdom, and United States. 
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implementation of energy and resource efficiency measures can act as a hedging measure 
against price volatility, and at the same time be obstructed by price volatility.  
Policy credibility. A lack of policy credibility is typically a consequence of frequent changes 
or time-inconsistency in policy making (World Bank, 2013). For instance, the implementation 
of green subsidies (e.g. for the installation of clean and efficient technology) may be a right 
step per se in favour of resource and energy efficiency. However, it must be paired with 
credibility. A typical example in the energy sector are feed-in tariffs, which aim to incentivise 
investments into renewable energy. If such tariffs lack long term credibility, investors may not 
take up the offer. Similarly, if firms do not expect carbon taxes to persist in the long term, they 
are less likely to invest in low carbon infrastructure (Brunner et al., 2012). Farzin & Kort (2000) 
show that such uncertainty surrounding environmental regulation raises firms’ discount rate 
and results in underinvestment in clean technology. Moreover, Krysiak (2008) shows that firms 
not only invest less (i.e. lower quantity) in efficient technologies, but also select socially sub-
optimal technology (i.e. lower quality). 
Economic, political, and corporate context. Besides the above types of uncertainty, which are 
directly associated with green investments (e.g. resource prices, or reliability of relevant 
regulation), more general uncertainties will also affect investment decisions (incl. political 
conflict, economic crises, etc.). This is not least due to their impact on discount rates (Gollier, 
2002). If uncertainties are perceived to be more significant, future benefits from efficiency 
investments may need to be discounted more (Pindyck, 1990). This negatively affects the cost-
benefit ratio of green investments, since benefits are typically spread throughout the future, 
while costs are mostly up-front.  
3. Policy instruments for improving resource efficiency 
Need for complementary policies 
Overall, if barriers are strong, the absence of complementary policies may mean that 
environmental taxes fail to trigger significant improvements of energy and resource efficiency, 
and overall environmental performance. In fact, this argument extends to environmental 
policies more broadly (including command & control regulation, quotas, and trading schemes). 
Avner et al. (2014) demonstrate the synergies between carbon or fuel taxes and complementary 
infrastructure investments: If investments in public transport infrastructure are made, 
commuters are more likely to respond to increasing fuel prices by switching from cars to low-
carbon public transport (thus improving the fuel efficiency of their commute). In a hypothetical 
scenario, in which no public infrastructure is provided, the authors estimate that carbon taxes 
would need to be 115 €/tCo2 to achieve a 6% reduction in carbon emissions from commuting. 
However, if public transport infrastructure is made available as a complement to carbon taxes, 
the same emission reduction can be achieved at 65 €/tCo2.  
To cite another example, the European Union’s directives on waste and landfills (European 
Commission, 1999; 2008) were adopted to reduce the negative externalities resulting from 
waste disposal, and has had a profound impact on the way waste in the EU is recycled or 
disposed. In the UK, landfill taxes have been one of the key instruments for implementing the 
Landfill Directive. By increasing the cost of disposal, waste treatment and recycling 
technologies become commercially more attractive, and less waste is produced in the first 
place. In the absence of waste tariffs, low disposal costs lead firms to produce ‘excess’ waste 
–often associated with significant environmental externalities (Morrisa et al., 1998). However, 
for these taxes to be effective, the EU Waste Framework Directive defines complementary 
targets which pertain to institutional context (incl. accountabilities and enforcement) and 
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capacity building, and are complemented by financial support mechanisms (European 
Commission, 1999; 2008). 
Fay et al. (2015) argue that complementary policies for supporting environmental policies (e.g. 
externality taxes) cover a wide range and include government support for research, 
development and innovation, performance standards, fiscal incentives for green investments, 
and social policies. Grubb & Ulph (2002) also argue that there can be significant synergies 
between environmental, technological and innovation policies. These policy types should 
however, be regarded as complements rather than substitutes (Fischer, 2008). Lecuyer & 
Quirion (2013) show that it can be socially optimal to implement complementary policies to 
carbon pricing in order to mitigate uncertainty.  
We provide further evidence in support of complementary policies, as Pigouvian taxes may be 
less effective at achieving their environmental objectives, if end-users and firms have restricted 
options to respond to environmental taxes. While Pigouvian taxes may address the market 
failure of environmental externalities, other market failures remain – such as the public goods 
nature of R&D and technological innovation. Popp (2006) shows that this combination of 
market failures requires a combination of policy measures. Addressing complementary policies 
can thus help to mitigate such barriers and reduce the costs of environmental price instruments 
(and thus increase public acceptability).  
 
Addressing distortions and complementing environmental taxes 
The variety of investment barriers to improving efficiency and environmental performance 
suggests the need for a carefully designed package of complementary policy measures, 
including efficiency audits, training, hard infrastructure investments, waste management and 
recycling schemes, as well as more structural regulatory reforms. Considering pollution, acute 
environmental destruction, and near capacity landfills, short and medium term measures for 
assisting firms to reduce their adverse environmental impacts are critical.  
At the same time the market and government failures, which led to investment barriers in the 
first place must also be addressed, as they will create new inefficiencies and perpetuate existing 
ones (Reddy et al., 2013; Cagno et al., 2013). This is important in order to achieve a larger 
scale enhancement of resource and energy efficiency, as well as to sustain efficiency gains and 
green development over time (Bleischwitz, 2012). Sorrell & Sijm (2003) argue that carbon 
pricing can be at the heart of such a policy mix, though trade-offs due to policy interactions 
may exist. Fankhauser et al. (2010) also suggest that combining multiple climate policy 
instruments bears risks to efficiency – though they mainly focus on combing different carbon 
pricing instruments, rather than complementary policies more broadly. 
Essentially, this prescribes two possible approaches for complementing environmental pricing 
instruments, and tackling firms’ investment barriers: (i) Addressing the immediate ‘Symptoms’ 
of investment barriers, i.e. help firms to deal with and overcome the adverse effects of pre-
existing investment barriers (e.g. supply specific technical information needed for increasing 
energy efficiency in a firm/sector); and (ii) Addressing the underlying ‘Causes’ of investment 
barriers, i.e. resolving the pre-existing market failures and structural inefficiencies, which cause 
the barriers in the first place (e.g. fix overall information infrastructure and technology 
dissemination systems). These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and both need to be part 
of a comprehensive strategy for resource efficiency.  
Complementary measures: intervention levels and types  
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Measures for complementing environmental taxes can broadly be distinguished into micro and 
macro level interventions: i.e. firm level measures, which support firms in overcoming the 
above mentioned investment barriers, and more comprehensive macro level measures, which 
reform structural deficiencies and inefficiencies of the overall system (see Table 2).  
Complementing environmental taxes at the micro level means to support specific firms with 
the implementation of efficiency projects, modernisation and green innovation – especially 
when firms may otherwise struggle to implement necessary changes. Such support comprises 
both technical assistance (especially for building capacity), as well as financial assistance 
which can enable concrete efficiency enhancing measures at the firm level in the presence of 
financial barriers (DeCanio, 1993; Anderson & Newell, 2004). 
Overall, micro level measures can be effective in facilitating quick efficiency gains in targeted 
industries, and may (eventually) lead to a bottom-up improvement of sector-wide 
environmental performance. Firm level measures are however less suitable for resolving the 
structural causes of barriers to green investment. 
Complementing environmental taxes at the macro level means to implement policy and 
regulatory reforms, which address incentive structures, and improve the investment 
environment within which firms operate (Reddy et al., 2013). As at the firm level, macro 
measures comprise non-monetary and monetary ones likewise.  
Complementary policy measures and interventions 
 Micro (i.e. firm) level Macro level 
 Technical Assistance Project Lending Technical Assistance & 
Policy Reform 
Development 
Lending 
Addressing 
the 
Symptoms 
of Market 
Distortions 
 Efficiency audits  
 Identification of 
specific projects 
 Installation of 
cleaner production 
infrastructure  
 Modernisation of 
production 
processes 
 Retro-fitting 
 Building strategies to 
improve material 
recovery from waste 
 
Addressing 
the 
Structural 
Causes of 
Investment 
Barriers 
 Building technical 
and managerial 
capacity 
 Establish systems 
for monitoring 
performance & info. 
disclosure,  
 Awareness building 
 Disseminate 
information & 
technology 
 Foster R&D and 
innovations 
 Infrastructure for 
information sharing 
and training 
 Infrastructure to 
link markets (e.g. 
transport 
infrastructure 
linking supply & 
demand for 
recycled materials) 
 
 Institution building 
 Fiscal policy reforms 
(e.g. energy subsidy 
reforms, waste tariffs) 
 Legal requirements for 
monitoring and 
disclosure of efficiency 
performance  
 Strengthening the 
financial sector 
 Dedicated lending 
facilities for resource 
efficiency projects 
 Foster competition 
 Developing 
markets and 
infrastructure 
 Strengthen 
macro-economy 
 Institution 
building 
 Direct support to 
research & 
innovation 
 Green growth 
strategies 
 
 
Table 2 This typology presents a toolbox for micro and macro interventions, which can complement price based 
environmental policy instruments. The categorisation is indicative and not definite: For instance, micro level 
measures may eventually lead to more structural macro improvements. 
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4. Conclusion – what it means for policy makers 
Environmental taxes are the policy instruments favoured by economists, as they are an efficient 
way of imposing the social and environmental costs of certain activities on those responsible. 
However imposing externality taxes per se does not necessarily cause firms (or end-users) to 
reduce harmful practices. It is critical to recognize that various market failures and distortions 
confront firms with investment barriers. These barriers mean that firms shoulder the 
environmental tax burden without being able (or willing) to improve environmental 
performance, or even passing it on to consumers. 
In practice, these barriers can prevent firms from investing in cleaner, more modern and 
efficient production. As a consequence well intentioned environmental taxes (and in fact 
environmental policies more generally) may fall short of their objective of triggering a 
reduction of adverse environmental impacts. This paper presents evidence suggesting that these 
barriers can be substantial and wide spread in practice. To successfully overcome this ‘web’ of 
barriers, it is critical to complement environmental policies, with measures for mitigating such 
investment barriers (Dijk & Kemp, 2016).  
Having presented a comprehensive overview of the most common reasons why firms may 
respond less to environmental taxes than policy makers envisage, we now conclude that in 
order for environmental taxes to be effective, they need to be designed and implemented with 
additional measures, which address the adverse role of investment barriers. For this purpose, 
this paper suggests a two-tiered multi-level policy toolbox: micro (i.e. firm level) and macro 
level measures, financial and technical support measures, short-term measures for immediate 
mitigation of investment barriers, as well as longer-term measures for addressing structural 
causes. Overall, by identifying and addressing investment barriers, policy makers can increase 
the prospects for environmental and resource taxes to successfully mitigate externalities and 
raise revenue. 
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